Egret

Changelog

Notable changes to Egret, following Keep a Changelog and Semantic Versioning.

[0.2.0] - Security hardening (pentest remediation)

Changed (upgrade impact)

  • A policy file with an unknown or misspelled key now fails to load instead of silently ignoring it. If you were relying on a key that was quietly dropped (e.g. a typo’d allow-endpoints), the run now errors until you correct it - this is intentional: a silently-ignored key meant the rule was never in effect.
  • The Action installer verifies the release signature when cosign is present. On a runner that already has cosign, a release whose SHA256SUMS.bundle signature doesn’t verify is now rejected (fail closed). The new require-signature input additionally makes cosign’s absence a hard failure.
  • The report directory may no longer be a symlink, and a local extends: ref may no longer resolve (via symlink or ..) outside the policy directory.

Security

  • Report artifacts are now tamper-resistant. report.json / .md / .sarif are written atomically (temp file + rename), and the build’s descendants are reaped (the whole build cgroup in block mode, the command’s process group in audit mode) BEFORE the report is written - so a process the build detaches can no longer race and overwrite the report that the SARIF upload, PR comment, and dashboard issue are generated from.
  • Report cells can no longer be forged via hostile filenames. mdEscape now strips CR/LF (and caps cell length), so a captured filename like evil\n\n## No violations can’t inject fake rows/headers into the Markdown report or job summary.
  • Protected-path matching is canonicalized. File/process policy now resolves .. and symlinks on both sides before matching, closing the traversal and symlink-through bypasses. (Relative-path writes remain best-effort pending capture-time cwd resolution - documented in SECURITY.md.)
  • extends: is confined to the policy directory. A local extends ref can no longer escape its base directory via .., an absolute path, or a symlink (containment is enforced on the symlink-resolved real path), so a crafted policy can’t pull an arbitrary local file in as its base - which on a root-privileged runner would be an arbitrary file read.
  • The report directory can’t be a symlink. Egret refuses to write reports through a symlinked output-dir, so the monitored build can’t swap the report directory for a symlink to an attacker-chosen location right before exiting.
  • Policy files are strict-decoded. An unknown or misspelled key (e.g. allow-endpoints) now fails fast instead of silently disabling the intended rule.
  • The DNS proxy refuses multi-question packets, closing a path where a denied name could ride along in a second question past the allowlist check.
  • The Action installer verifies the release cosign signature. When cosign is present, SHA256SUMS.bundle is verified (fail closed) before trusting the checksum; a new require-signature input makes its absence a hard failure.
  • CI/CD hardening: concurrency + per-job timeout-minutes across CI/Security workflows, zizmor tool-failure no longer hidden behind || true, and action.yml uses $GITHUB_ACTION_PATH instead of interpolating github.action_path into run:.

Documentation

  • SECURITY.md gains a “Trust boundaries and known limitations” section: the policy file is read from the checked-out ref (attacker-editable on pull_request unless loaded from the base branch), and file/process policy is best-effort detection, not an enforcement boundary.
  • Usage examples pin the Action to a commit SHA (floating tags noted as the convenience alternative).

0.1.3 - Action rename + Code Scanning cleanup

Changed

  • Renamed the Marketplace Action to “Egret Security Action” (was “Egret Security”), so the Action is distinguished from the Egret Security App by tool type. Reference it unchanged as NX1X/Egret@v0 or a pinned @v0.1.3.
  • Dogfood: our own CI test suites now run under the Egret Action in audit mode, so CI monitors the egress/exec/file behaviour of the toolchain and dependency code during the tests (audit never blocks the build).

Security

  • Closed all CodeQL go/incorrect-integer-conversion findings in the block-mode credential path: build uid/gid are parsed as bounded 32-bit values and carried as uint32 end to end, with no unchecked int narrowing.
  • Scoped the self-test App installation token to least privilege (checks / issues / pull-requests write, contents read) instead of the App’s blanket installation permissions (zizmor github-app).
  • Removed step-output template injection in the self-test enforcement assertion by passing step outputs through env (zizmor template-injection).

0.1.2 - Brand refresh

Changed

  • New visual identity. The mark is now an egret in flight; the icon, app-icon, logo (a self-contained dark-card lockup), and social preview were all redrawn.
  • Marketplace branding icon is now feather (the Actions Marketplace supports only a named Feather icon + color, so the egret artwork cannot be the listing tile).
  • README now leads with the logo lockup.

0.1.1 - Marketplace listing + App-token publishing

Added

  • GitHub Marketplace listing. The Action now lives at the repository root and is published as “Egret Security” on the Actions Marketplace. Reference it as NX1X/Egret@v0 (floating major) or a pinned @v0.1.1.
  • App-token publish features. New action inputs github-token, check-run, pr-comment, and dashboard-issue: pass a GitHub App installation token to publish a branded pass/fail check, a sticky PR comment, and the Egret Security Dashboard issue as egret-security-app[bot] (each opt-in; falls back to GITHUB_TOKEN).

Fixed

  • Action install checksum verification now hash-compares the downloaded binary directly, so install no longer fails closed on a valid release (the binary is saved under a different on-disk name than the SHA256SUMS entry).
  • SARIF results always carry a location (fall back to a suggested policy path), which GitHub Code Scanning requires - SARIF uploads are no longer rejected.

Changed

  • Go toolchain 1.26.5 (clears the crypto/tls, net/textproto, and x509 stdlib advisories); codeql-action v4, checkout v7, setup-go v6, refreshed base-image digests.
  • Release notes are now sourced from this CHANGELOG.

0.1.0 - first release

Egret is a runtime security agent for CI/CD and Linux hosts: eBPF-based egress filtering, network/process/file monitoring, and audit-mode policy generation - shipped as a CLI and a GitHub Action, with no server and no phone-home.

Added

  • Runtime monitoring (audit mode). eBPF probes record every outbound connection (IPv4/IPv6), the process tree, and writes to protected paths; evaluate them against a policy.yaml; and emit a Markdown/JSON report plus SARIF.
  • Egress enforcement (block mode). A DNS proxy plus cgroup-scoped nftables default-deny confine a build to its allowlist, with the build run de-privileged so it can’t escape the confinement. Validated on bare/VM hosts; on container CI runners, audit mode is recommended for now.
  • Policy (policy.yaml): domain allowlist (allowed-endpoints, with *. wildcards), raw IP/CIDR allowlist (allowed-ips), block-raw-ip, protected paths, disallowed processes, and extends: for a shared base policy (local or org://).
  • GitHub Action. Wrap a job command, upload SARIF to Code Scanning, and write the job summary. Inputs include command, policy, mode, disable-sudo, and an optional ingest-url to POST the run to a self-hosted dashboard.
  • GitHub App integration (server-less): PR checks, sticky comments, a self-updating allowlist dashboard issue, and an audit → allowlist-PR loop - all work with a plain GITHUB_TOKEN or an App token.

Security

  • Signed, verifiable releases: each release ships SHA256SUMS, SLSA build provenance, and a keyless cosign signature; the Action verifies the binary before running it.
  • Hardened by default: no phone-home; egress/event records are metadata only (never payloads); block mode is fail-closed on teardown.